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TREATMENT FOR
MISBEHAVING MINORS*
The New York Family Court Act (FCA) mandates that children found
to be "persons in need of supervision" (PINS)' must be provided with
"appropriate supervision or treatment." 2 In distinguishing PINS from juvenile delinquents,3 the Legislature attempted "to reduce the instances of
stigma and at the same time to permit the Court to use appropriate resources in dealing with persons in need of supervision." 4 Unfortunately, the
humanitarian concern for the welfare and rehabilitation of PINS, evidenced by such legislative pronouncements,' has rarely been implemented
* This article is a student work prepared by Barbara P. Gertel, a member of the ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973) provides:

"Persons in need of supervision" means a male less than sixteen years of age and a
female less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school in accord with the
provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education law or who is incorrigible,
ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or
other lawful authority.
This provision's validity has been subjected to attack on several occasions. See In re
Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972), wherein the New York
Court of Appeals held section 712(b) as applied to females aged 16-18 unconstitutional. In
Mercado v. Rockefeller, 363 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2120, 2d
Cir., Oct. 10, 1973, three parolees from state training institutions claimed that section 712(b)
was unconstitutional due to its vagueness and overbreadth, its punishment of a status in
derogation of the eighth amendment, and its violation of due process "in that it restrain[ed]
their liberty without serving any legitimate state purpose." Id. at 490. The court, however,
dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust available state remedies.
2 N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 711 (McKinney 1963) provides, in part, that "[tihe purpose of this
article is to provide a due process of law . . . for devising an appropriateorder of disposition
for any person adjudged . . . in need of supervision." (emphasis added). Section 743 states
that "[in the case of a petition to determine need for supervision, 'dispositional hearing'
means a hearing to determine whether the respondent requires supervision or treatment."
Section 756 provides for the placement of a PINS child in his own home or in the custody of
a suitable relative or other suitable person or an authorized agency, or a youth opportunity
center. Id. § 756 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
When read in conjunction, these three sections reflect a "deliberate . . . plan to place
. . . [PINS] in authorized agencies for treatment and rehabilitation and not to commit them
to penal institutions." In re Anonymous, 20 App. Div. 2d 395, 400, 247 N.Y.S.2d 323, 328-29
(1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 905, 200 N.E.2d 857, 252 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1964).
1 Juvenile delinquents are persons over seven and less than sixteen years of age who do acts
which, if done by adults, would constitute a crime. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 712(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1973).
4 SECOND REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON COURT REORGANIZATION,

McKin-

ney's Sess. Laws 3435 (1962) [hereinafter cited as SECOND REPORT].
I The draftsmen of the FCA noted that the underlying humanitarian philosophy of the act is
to "guide and supervise, rather than punish children in trouble." Id. at 3437.
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by the family court
Prompted by its benevolent attitude, the Legislature was initially
loath to place PINS in New York State training schools housing juvenile
delinquents.' Shortly after the law's enactment, however, family court
judges found that a "gap" existed between the statutory mandate to provide PINS with appropriate supervision or treatment and the pragmatic
consideration of the limited availability of proper facilities for their placement." The Legislature, therefore, amended the FCA on a yearly basis to
permit the placement of PINS in state training schools.' In 1968, this
provision was made permanent due to a continuing shortage of private
facilities.' 0 Legislative authorization of such placement, however, was intended solely to eliminate the "gap" and to secure a facility in which PINS
would obtain the necessary treatment and supervision mandated by the
FCA. In actuality, all major investigative studies of state training schools"
JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH AND DRUG ABUSE,

Doc. No. 19, 1 WHAT CHANCE FOR CHILDREN? A REPORT ON WHAT

Leg.

HAPPENS IN NEW YORK STATE

27 (1970) [hereinafter cited as JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE].
The Joint Legislative Committee commented:
The decision not to authorize a commitment in the case of a person in need of supervision is an important element of the statutory pattern. Any commitment - whether
"civil" or "criminal", whether assertedly for "punitive" or "rehabilitative" purposes
- involves a grave interference with personal liberty and is justified only by urgent
reason. There is a second reason for this decision. The Committee has been advised
by many persons that existing facilities for children are not wholly satisfactory.
SECOND REPORT, supra note 4, at 3435-36.
See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 40 Misc. 2d 1058, 1060, 245 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266-67 (Family Ct.
Bronx County 1963). See also Anonymous v. People, 20 App. Div. 2d 395, 400, 247 N.Y.S.2d
323, 329 (1st Dep't 1964).
Those agencies, private and voluntary, already in existence did not provide the services
needed for the large number of PINS requiring placement. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES, THE PINS CHILD: A PLETHORA OF
PROBLEMS 7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT].
Ch. 518, [19641 N.Y. LAWS 1472-73; ch. 126, [1965] N.Y. LAWS 746; ch. 705, [1966] N.Y.
LAWS 1501-02 (expired 1968).
Ch. 874, [1968] N.Y. LAWS 2654-55.
See OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, DIVISION OF AUDITS AND ACCOUNTS, REP. No. A1-StTO THE YOUNG IN TROUBLE

15-74, AUDIT REPORT ON REHABILITATION OF ADOLESCENTS AT STATE RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES,
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION FOR YOUTH (1973) [hereinafter cited as No. 15 LEVITT
REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, DIVISION OF AUDIT AND ACCOUNTS, REP. No. AlAUDIT REPORT ON SELECTED OPERATING AND FINANCIAL PRACTICES, EXECUTIVE DEPART-

St-16-74,

MENT, DIVISION FOR YOUTH, March 1, 1971 to February 28, 1973 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
No. 16 LEVITT REPORT]; COMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE
FAMILY COURT IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED: PRETENSIONS AND
REALITIES OF TREATMENT SERVICES
LATIVE COMMITTEE
NEW

YORK

supra note 6;

STATE

TRAINING

[hereinafter cited as CITIZENS'

(1972) [hereinafter cited as POLIER

REPORT]; JOINT LEGIS-

CITIZENS' COMMITTEE FOR CHILDREN OF NEW YORK, INC., THE
SCHOOL

SYSTEM:

FINDINGS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

PARTMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON YOUTH AND CORRECTION, OUT OF SIGHT MIND:

A

(1969)

COMMITTEE]; COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, DEOUT OF

REPORT OF AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE TRAINING SCHOOLS IN THE DOWN-

STATE COMPLEX

(1968).
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and significant appellate division case law"2 have shown that these schools
totally fail to provide PINS with appropriate rehabilitative treatment.
Within this context, the recent landmark decision of the New York
Court of Appeals, In re Ellery C.,'3 was formulated. The case originated in
the family court upon a petition filed by Ellery C.'s mother alleging that
her son "refused to go to school, kept late hours, fought with his siblings,
stole from home and refused to obey her just commands."' 4 A probation
report further revealed that the boy used drugs and had an I.Q. of 69. After
attempts to reform the boy proved futile,' 5 a PINS dispositional hearing
was convened, which resulted in Ellery C.'s commitment to the New York
State Training School at Otisville.'5 On appeal, the Appellate Division,
Second Department, by a closely divided vote, affirmed the order'7 noting
that "[w]here . . .every effort to place the infant . . . in a nonstructured
facility meets with failure, the only suitable environment, unfortunately,
is the confinement of a State Training Center." 8
The Court of Appeals reversed,'" holding that "persons in need of
supervision may not validly be placed in a state training school. '20 The
proceeding was remitted to the family court for the purpose of placing the
appellant in a suitable environment. In reaching this decision, Chief Judge
Fuld, writing for a unanimous court, stated:
The conclusion is clear. Proper facilities must be made available to provide
adequate supervision and treatment for children found to be persons in need
of supervision . . . . [T]herefore. . . . the appellant's confinement in the
training school, along with juveniles convicted of committing criminal acts,
See, e.g., In re Jeanette P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1970); In re
Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 419, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dep't 1970).
32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973).
" See Brief for Appellant at 3, In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d
51(1973).
,5Between March 2 and March 9, Ellery C. was remanded to a juvenile center because his
mother refused to take him home. Id. On March 9, he was paroled to his mother until April
15, at which time he was placed on a 12-month probation period on condition that his school
attendance improve. On August 18, however, Mrs. C. filed another petition alleging that her
son had violated the terms of probation. A finding of such violation was made and Ellery C.
was instructed to attend a mental health clinic. The court soon paroled the boy to an uncle
in Alabama, but Ellery returned home after two weeks. Three months later, Mrs. C. reported
her son's failure to cooperate with the mental health clinic, and on February 2, 1972, he was
referred to the Federal Addiction Services. Although his progress there was reported as favorable, the boy left the program two months later. Id. at 3-5.
11Ellery C.'s law guardian excepted to the court's disposition stating that such placement
was "inappropriate and not in the best interest of the child." Id. at 9. He further argued that
no correlation existed between Ellery C.'s need for treatment and his incarceration in a state
training school. Id. at 8-9.
,140 App. Div. 2d 862, 337 N.Y.S.2d 936 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
12

.3

IxId.
'Y 32
Z,

N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973).
Id. at 592, 300 N.E.2d at 425, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
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"can hardly, in any realistic sense, serve as 'supervision' and 'treatment' for
him."I'

This holding has given rise to conflicting interpretations as to its true
import. The State Division for Youth (DFY), 2 the agency that operates the
training schools, adopted the view that Ellery C. merely condemned the
"co-mingling" of PINS and juvenile delinquents. Therefore, Milton Luger,
Director of DFY, notified the family court judges and probation directors
of his plan to implement DFY's interpretation of Ellery C. Phase I of the
agency's program,2" effective September 19, 1973, retained the use of the
training schools but designated separate schools for juvenile delinquents
and PINS.24
An alternative interpretation of Ellery C. is that it requires an absolute prohibition against the placement of PINS in state training schools,
irrespective of the presence of juvenile delinquents therein. This position,
which appears consistent with the views espoused by state legislators, 2 has
26
been endorsed by the Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal Aid Society.
Legal Aid maintains that the opinion on its face evidences the fact that
PINS have a statutory right to treatment which the New York State training schools have failed to provide.2
Id. at 591, 300 N.E.2d at 425, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 53, quoting In re Ellery C., 40 App. Div. 2d
862, 864, 337 N.Y.S.2d 936, 940 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.) (dissenting opinion).
1 The Division for Youth, a part of the Executive Department, was established in 1960 to
continue the functions of the Youth Commission. In 1971, the state training schools were
transferred to the Division "to consolidate youth-related activities in a single agency in order
to improve the coordination of Youth programs within the State." No. 15 LEvrrr REPORT,
supra note 11, at 1.
3 Phase II of this program involves the development of co-educational programs at nearly
all the facilities and is to be "implemented as necessary changes are completcd at each of
the newly designated co-educational facilities." Letter from Milton Luger, Director of Division for Youth, New York State Executive Department, Sept. 17, 1973.
" See id., which designates four schools for delinquents and four others for PINS. It should
be noted, however, that on Sept. 19, 1973, one adjudicated female juvenile delinquent was
assigned to Hudson, a New York State training school designated for PINS girls only. Furthermore, in late September, 19 of the 64 girls at Hudson were juvenile delinquents. It appears
that those juvenile delinquents already in residence at PINS designated schools in September, 1973, were asked to sign waivers of transfer to institutions reserved for juvenile delinquents. Apparently, DFY is not abiding by its own interpretation of Ellery C. Interviews with
Steven M. Schlussel, Associate Appellate Counsel, the Legal Aid Society, Juvenile Rights
Division, New York, Dec., 1973, Jan., Feb., 1974 [hereinafter cited as Interview with
Schlussell. Mr. Schlussel is the attorney who represented Ellery C. in the Appellate Division,
Second Department, and the Court of Appeals.
25 See text accompanying notes 1 & 2 supra.
z PINS children are represented by Legal Aid at all stages of the judicial proceedings.
Although the FCA authorizes the use of private counsel, in practice, the Legal Aid attorneys
are assigned to virtually every child brought before the court. The right to counsel "is particularly important for PINS children since in so many cases the parent is proceeding against
21

the child."

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT,

supra note 8, at 16.

1 Interview with Schlussel, supra note 24. See also Memorandum from Mara Thorpe to Staff
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Having defined the issue created by Ellery C., Legal Aid and DFY
recently afforded the Court of Appeals, in In re Maurice C.,28 an opportunity for its resolution. The court, therein, recognized PINS' right to proper
treatment, yet sanctioned DFY's interpretation of Ellery C.29 Thus, placement of these children in New York State training schools solely housing
PINS is currently permissible.
Nevertheless, Legal Aid's viewpoint appears superior to that of DFY
and consistent with the Court of Appeals' holding in Ellery C. This position can be substantiated by a consideration of several factors: (1) an
analysis of the general PINS profile; (2) their statutory and, arguably,
constitutional right to adequate rehabilitative treatment; (3) the current
unsatisfactory condition of state training schools; and (4) the subsequent
judicial interpretation of Ellery C. Discussion of these points will lend
credence to the assertion that the current placement of PINS in state
training schools constitutes a denial of the child's right to treatment and,
as such, must be prohibited.
THE

PINS

PROFILE

The legislative creation of the PINS classification in 1962 represented
enlightened . . . recognition of the difference between youngsters who committed criminal acts and those who merely misbehave in ways which, frequently, would not be objectionable save for the fact that the actor is a minor
30

Although PINS and juvenile delinquents both require rehabilitation, treatment of delinquents should be designed to eliminate the motivation behind
specific and oftentimes isolated criminal conduct; rehabilitative techniques appropriate in dealing with PINS, however, must alleviate broader
behavioral problems as difficult to deal with, yet less objectionable than
criminality.'
Attorneys of the Legal Aid Society, Juvenile Rights Division, New York, Aug. 21, 1973; Letter
from Steven Schlussel to State Senator James H. Donovan, July 17, 1973. With regard to the
failure of the state training schools to provide adequate rehabilitative programs for PINS, see
reports cited note 11 supra.
11No. 361B (Ct. App., July 15, 1974), rev'g 44 App. Div. 2d 114, 354 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't
1974). The Court of Appeals decided this case in conjunction with In re Lavette M., No. 361A
(Ct. App., July 15, 1974). In Layette M. a 13 year-old adjudicated PINS was committed to a
state training school after unsuccessful attempts were made at private placement. The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the order and was in turn affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
11Id. at 3. The opinion in Maurice C. was written by Judge Jasen and concurred in by all
except Judges Rabin and Stevens who took no part. Chief Judge Fuld, who wrote the opinion
in Ellery C., retired from the bench prior to the appeal in Maurice C.
" In re Jeanette P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 662, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (2d Dep't 1970).
",See Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), quoting Judge Florence
Kelley, Administrative Judge of the Family Court.

MISBEHAVING MINORS

In November, 1973, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) released
the results of a study dealing with PINS." One stated purpose of this report
was to disclose the genesis of PINS' behavioral problems.Y The study
provided information based upon a sample of 316 PINS placed outside
their homes by the family court between June, 1971 and May, 1972. Approximately half of these children were black; the remainder were evenly
divided between whites and Puerto Ricans.3 4 On the basis of the information acquired, it was OCS's hope that appropriate resources for the rehabilitation of PINS would be developed.3
The mass of statistics gathered in this report clearly indicated the
urgent need for proper care and treatment of PINS. For example, 80 percent of the sample reportedly came from the most deprived areas in New
York City where few community services were available. The children
resided in apartments described as small, dirty and deteriorated. Sixty-one
percent were classified as living in severe poverty.3
In addition to their dismal physical surroundings, PINS were generally shown to suffer from unstable home environments. Seventy-three percent of the 316 PINS came from single-parent families or broken homes.
Forty-three percent of the total sample were born out of wedlock. Among
37 percent of the children, the parents were either separated, divorced, or
the father of the family deceased. In 55 percent of the cases in which the
father had left home, the departure occurred prior to the child's fifth
birthday. As OCS aptly noted, these figures "underscore the lack of continuity and cohesion among these poverty families and the consequent lack,
'37
at times, of care and adequate supervision for many of their children.
Inasmuch as the family court's assertion of jurisdiction over juveniles
is based on the parens patriae theory, i.e., the state adopts the role of
parent when the natural parent has failed to do so, a brief description of
PINS' actual parents and their relationship to the children is useful. Of
32 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8. The Office of Children's Services was estab-

lished in June, 1972 "to serve as an advocate within the judicial system for improved services
for court-related children in New York City." Id. at preface.
Id. at 12.
Twenty percent of the entire sample were placed with the training school system. Twentyfour percent of the black and 24% of the Puerto Rican children were placed in such schools,
whereas only 12% of the white children were so placed. Id. at 76. These disproportionate
figures can be explained in part by the discriminatory admissions policies of the voluntary
and private agencies. One report reveals that in 1970-71, as a result of this discrimination,
the family court was forced to place 76% of the black and 66% of the Puerto Rican children
in training schools and public shelters. On the other hand, 78% of the white children were
provided care by private, publicly funded agencies. POLLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 22. See
also 15 LEvrrr REPORT, supra note 11, at 106.
a JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
Id. at 23-24, 28.
5 Id. at 25. These figures also indicate a major barrier to PINS' access to care in voluntary
agencies which prefer, if not demand, an intact and cooperative family with which to work
for the return of the child to the community. Id. at 26.
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the 316 cases, 52 percent of the parents were classified as inadequate or
unable to cope with their children's behavior or their own personal problems; 49 percent were "rejecting" the children and, in some cases, desirous
of being rid of them; 36 percent were categorized as strict in discipline and
in their expectations of the children; and 35 percent were reportedly neglectful in providing material benefits or sufficient supervision, love, or
understanding. Mental illness among the parents was discovered in 61
and 30 of the mothers
percent of the sample cases. Fifty-eight of the fathers
39
were reportedly alcoholics or abusers of alcohol.
The fact that 104 of the 316 PINS had lived away from their families
prior to placement in state training facilities provided an additional source
of insecurity for the children.40 Forty-six of the children had been separated
from their parents prior to reaching the age of six. Twenty-five percent of
the 104 PINS living away from home had been placed in child care institutions, 18 percent with foster parents, and 42 percent with relatives. Another 14 percent of the 104 children had received treatment in state hospitals for the mentally ill."
Additionally, evidence of school-related problems indicates the PINS
child's need for special treatment. Of the 316 children surveyed, 224 were
reportedly truant and 79 had been medically suspended, placed on home
instruction, assigned to a "school for socially maladjusted children," or put
in special classes. Forty-five children were awaiting assignment to special
class, school, or home instruction when placed by the family court.2
Among those PINS who attended regular public school classes,43 the
median grade level was the eighth; however, the median reading level
hovered between the fifth and sixth.4 It should be noted that the median
I.Q. score of 78 percent of the sample was between 81 and 90. 41 According
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 37-38. A study of the petitions filed in the family court against the sample PINS and
the psychiatric evaluations ordered by the judges further reveals the extent of PINS domestic
problems: 65% of the 316 petitions were filed by the children's mothers. Once court action
had commenced, 21% of the families refused to take their children home, and 8% of the PINS
refused to return home. Id.
Among the allegations in the petitions, a large number included charges of sexual promiscuity or association with undesirable companions, drug abuse, and excessive drinking. Over
one-third of the sample were alleged to have committed thefts or assaults. Id. at 45. Psychiatric evaluations of the PINS children most frequently diagnose the problems as "personality
disorder," "adjustment reaction to adolescence," and "passive aggressive personality." In
fact, 16% of the 316 sample cases had a history of psychiatric hospitalization. Id. at 47.
* Id. at 40.
* Seventy-five percent of the 316 children were in regular public school classes. Id. at 43.
* The national and New York City reading level for eighth grade students ranges between
8.1 and 8.9 depending upon the month in which the reading tests are administered. Interview
with J. Colligan, Coordinator of City-Wide Testing for New York City Public Schools, Board
of Education, April 18, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Interview with Colligan].
" The children's I.Q. scores ranged from 51 to 100 plus. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
'
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to OCS, these figures not only reflect the serious problems of PINS, but
also indicate why many of the PINS are placed in state training schools
rather than private facilities. Most of the voluntary agencies and DFY
homes and work camps" have admissions standards which include minimum grade and I.Q. levels." PINS not meeting these requirements are
placed in the state training schools.4
The survey further disclosed that only 198 of the 316 PINS studied
were admitted to the highly selective voluntary agencies and DFY homes.
With respect to those PINS who were not accepted by these agencies, OCS
noted: "Generally, several reasons are given for rejecting a child - and the
reasons describe the PINS child."4 9 The report further observed:
The children with serious emotional problems, . . . drug users, children with
a history of mental illness, children who lack an intact family - these are
the children who will be denied admission to those elite programs.0

These are the PINS who are placed in state training schools5' and who find
themselves most in need of either a statutorily or judicially enunciated
right to treatment.
THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT

Based upon OCS's accurate, yet disheartening, portrayal of PINS, it
is evident that significant rehabilitative treatment must be afforded these
children. The responsibility for ensuring that such treatment is forthcoming has fallen upon the government. As noted, justification for the estabnote 8, at 50. On the national level 95 plus is considered normal. Interview with Colligan,
supra note 44. Forty-eight percent of the PINS tested fell within the 90-100 plus range. A
majority of this group were placed with voluntary agencies. Another 48% of the children had
I.Q. scores between 70 and 90. These are the PINS that are placed in training schools or
shelters. Almost 13% of these had scores of 75 or below; 4% had scores of 70 or under. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 52. See also Sussman, Psychological Testing: Is It a
Valid JudicialFunction? 70 N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1973, at 1, col. 6, which criticizes the use of
I.Q. test results in the family courts' dispositional hearings.
,1In addition to state training schools, DFY operates a wide range of urban homes, group
homes, foster homes, and work camps, referred to as "Title II facilities." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 502-509 (McKinney 1972).
" JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 44.
I Id.
" Id. at 55.
:"Id. at 9.
As a result of a number of pre-Ellery C. intermediate appellate decisions in which the
placement of PINS in training schools were reversed, the number of such placements dropped
sharply. Id. at 8. See, e.g., In re Arlene H., 38 App. Div. 2d 570, 328 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't
1971); In re Edwards, 37 App. Div. 2d 977, 328 N.Y.S.2d 235 (2d Dep't 1971); In re Jeanette
P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1970); In re Ilone I., 64 Misc. 2d 878,
316 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Family Ct. Queens County 1970). When Ellery C. was decided there were
128 PINS from New York City in training schools. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
8, at 9.
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lishment of the PINS category emanates from the parenspatriae power of
the state. 52 This power embodies the right of the state, where necessary,
to substitute itself for the natural parent - to protect, care for, treat and
rehabilitate the child in order to save him from harm and make him a
5
useful citizen. 1
In asserting its role under the parenspatriae theory, the family court's
placement of PINS in state training schools must meet the statutory and,
arguably, constitutional requirement54 of furnishing adequate therapeutic
treatment for these children.5 5 With respect to the relatively recent notion
of a right to treatment, 5 it has been observed:
[A] new concept of substantive due process is evolving in the therapeutic
realm. This concept is founded upon a recognition of the concurrency between the state's exercise of sanctioning powers and its assumption of the
duties of social responsibility. Its implication is that effective treatment must
See Donahue, New York Family Court Act: Article 7 -

Its Philosophy and its Aim, 15

SYRACUSE L. REV. 679 (1964).
.53 Sge

34;

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1967). See also SECOND

REPORT,

supra note 4, at 3433-

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK

2-4 (1967); Fox, Juvenile Justice
Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1238-39 (1970); Kettrie, Can the
Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?,57 GEO. L.J. 848, 851-53 (1969);
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909).
51 Although the United States Supreme Court has not as yet held that there exists a constitutional right to treatment for juveniles, the author agrees with Adrian R. Gough who has
remarked:
[T]here is no little thought, and I am persuaded, that it [the right to treatment] can
be constitutionally based. To impose custody because of a need for care and treatment
and then fail to provide that treatment offends against due process and equal protection, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Gough, The Beyond-Control Child and the Right to Treatment:An Exercise in the Synthesis
of Paradox, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 182, 183 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Beyond-Control Child].
But see Note, A Right to Treatment for Juveniles?, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 157 (1973), which
attempts to persuade the reader that there should be no constitutional right to treatment for
juveniles committed to institutions.
"- See Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), wherein the court observed:
Where the State, as parens patriae,imposes such detention, it can meet the Constitution's requirement of due process and prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment if,
and only if, it furnishes adequate treatment to the detainee.
It has generally been accepted that the right to treatment doctrine was first promulgated
by Dr. Morton Birnbaum in 1960. See note 71 and accompanying text infra. But see White
v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954). Although the White decision was based on statutory
grounds, the court, in ordering the juvenile petitioner's release from jail, noted:
Unless the institution is one whose primary concern is the individual's moral and
physical well-being, unless its facilities are intended for and adopted to guidance, care,
education and training rather than punishment, unless its supervision is that of a
guardian, not that of a prison guard or jailor, it seems clear a commitment to such
institution cannot withstand an assault for violation of fundamental Constitutional
safeguards.
Id. at 650.
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be the quid pro quo for society's right to exercise its parens patriaecontrols.
Whether specifically recognized by statutory enactment or implicitly derived
from the constitutional requirements of due process, the right to treatment
exists. 7
The Statutory Right to Treatment
By virtue of the FCA, a solid statutory foundation exists for the proposition that PINS are entitled to proper treatment. Section 732 of the Act
mandates, inter alia, that a PINS petition allege the child's need for "supervision or treatment."58 Before a PINS adjudication can be made, such
need must be established by a preponderance of the evidence at a dispositional hearing. 9 For example, if Corporation Counsel, which prosecutes
PINS cases in New York City, fails to satisfy this burden, the family court
must dismiss the petition. 0
Once the need for "supervision or treatment" is established, the Act
imposes a duty upon the family court to make a dispositional order in
accordance with section 711. This section provides:
The purpose of this article is to provide a due process of law . . . for devising
an appropriateorder of disposition for any person adjudged . . . in need of
supervision.'
Consequently, "[i]n regard to persons found to be in need of supervision,
the deprivation of freedom is authorized only if placement provides treatment."62 To comply with this statutory mandate, section 255 of the FCA
authorizes the family court to order state and local officials and agencies
to render all necessary cooperation so these children may receive "such
care, protection and assistance as will best enhance their welfare."
Furthermore, in recognition of the behavioral differences existing between juvenile delinquents and PINS, the Legislature drew a distinction
between the facilities in which each could be appropriately placed." Thus,
the FCA directs that the need for "confinement" may provide the basis for
an adjudication and placement of a juvenile delinquent in a state training
school.6 However, the Act withholds from the family court the right to
Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 GEO. L.J.
848, 870 (1969).
17

N.Y.

FAMILY CT.

Acr § 732 (McKinney 1963).

Id. §§ 743, 745, 752.
Id. § 751.
Id. § 711 (emphasis added).
62 POLLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
'3 N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 255 (McKinney Supp. 1973). Section 255, as amended, gives the
family court greater power than existed under the old law. Previously, the FCA only enabled
the family court judge to "seek" cooperation, whereas section 255 presently authorizes the
court to "order" cooperation. This significant change reflects the legislature's profound
interest in, and growing concern with, the necessity of securing dispositions appropriate to
the needs of children within the family court's jurisdiction. See id.
' See SECOND REPORT, supra note 4, at 3435-36.
' N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 743 (McKinney 1963).
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place PINS in such confinement." PINS may be placed in facilities that
treat or supervise, but never confine. Accordingly, the Appellate Division,
First Department, in Anonymous v. People7 stated:
The entire structure of the act reflects a deliberate and calculated plan
to place . . . PINS
rehabilitation .

.

. .

in authorized agencies for treatment and

. .68

More recently, upon examination of the FCA, the Family Court, Bronx
County, in In re Neil M.19 noted that:
[the court] must . . . be prepared to hold that . . . [the Act]...
create[s] a vested right . . . [in the infant] . . . to treatment rather than

a liability to be subject to it. 0
ConstitutionalArguments For a Right to Treatment
In 1960, the constitutional right to treatment doctrine was introduced
by Dr. Morton Birnbaum in the field of mental health. He proposed that
the involuntary confinement of the mentally ill to institutions lacking
adequate treatment facilities constituted commitment to a mental prison
and that substantive due process prohibited such deprivation of a mentally
ill person's liberty.7 ' The right to treatment in the mental health field has
since won recognition in both state and federal courts.7" The principle
governing these cases is theoretically applicable to the juvenile justice
system - that is, in exercising its parens patriae power to restrain the
child's freedom, the juvenile court must provide adequate rehabilitative
treatment.7"
Various state and federal courts have voiced their approval of a consti00

Id.

20 App. Div. 2d 395, 247 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1st Dep't 1964).
Id. at 400, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 328-29.
00 71 Misc. 2d 396, 336 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Family Ct. Bronx County 1972).
Id. at 399, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
7, Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 503 (1960).
7
See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Nason v. Superintendant of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604,
233 N.E.2d 908 (1968); cf. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Commonwealth
v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959).
11 If adults suffering from mental illness are entitled to the right to treatment, then surely
PINS children, plagued by behavioral and educational problems, must be afforded similar
treatment all the more so because the State has promised these children, through the exercise
of its parerm patriae power, that it will guide, supervise and treat them. See generally Bim07

baum, Some Comments on the Right to Treatment, 13
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(1966); Symposium, The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 673 et. seq. (1969); Symposium,
The Mentally Ill and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 et seq. (1969); Note,
Persons in Need of Supervision: Is there a Constitutional Right to Treatment?, 39 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 624, 645-57 (1973); Note, Adequate Psychiatric Treatment - A Constitutional
Right?, 19 CATH. LAW. 322 (1973); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the Right to
Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
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tutional right to treatment where juveniles are concerned. In State v.
Owens,7' the Kansas Supreme Court held unconstitutional the juvenile
court's commitment of boys 16 years of age or over to the state industrial
reformatory. The court described the institution as penal rather than rehabilitative in nature. In outlining the constitutional requirements, the court
remarked that "[tihe rehabilitative caretaking offered in exchange for
constitutional protections must be substantive and real, not mere verbiage."75
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in In re Wilson,76 arrived at a similar decision. There, a 16-year-old adjudicated delinquent had been committed to a state correctional institution for an indefinite term which, due
to his age, could extend up to five years. A criminal conviction would have
resulted in confinement in the same institution, but for a shorter period of
time. In holding this distinction constitutionally invalid, the court noted
that the longer commitment could be upheld only if it was clear that it
would "result in the juvenile's receiving appropriate rehabilitative care
and not just in his being deprived of his liberty for a longer time."77
8
On the federal level, in Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Afflect,1
a class action was brought alleging, inter alia, that the training school
inmates' right to rehabilitative treatment, in the form of vocational training, drug programs, and psychiatric counseling had been denied. In ruling
that the plaintiffs were entitled to a psychiatric counseling program, the
court commented that "due process in the juvenile justice system requires
that the post-adjudicative stage of institutionalization further . . . [the]
goal of rehabilitation."79 Similarly, in Nelson v. Heyne, 0 the court held
that children placed in the Indiana Boys School were "entitled to a right
to treatment under . . . the Federal Constitution."8 1
A recent and significant decision concerning the juvenile's right to
treatment is Martarella v. Kelley. 82 In Martarella, the federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York answered the question
whether PINS may constitutionally be confined in secure detention centers
7, 197 Kan. 212, 416 P.2d 259 (1966).
7 416 P.2d at 269-70. The court also commented: "If after a juvenile proceeding, the juvenile
can be committed to a place of penal servitude, the entire claim of parenspatriaebecomes a
hypocritical mockery." 416 P.2d at 269. At the hearing in this action, the director of penal
institutions testified that the state industrial reformatory, to which boys 16 years of age and
over were being committed, was a maximum security facility with iron bars, cell houses,
and guard towers. The director also explained that the reformatory had no trained professional social workers. Id.
438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970).
264 A.2d at 618 (1970).
346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
Id. at 1364.
355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
Id. at 459.
' 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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without treatment. The court held that the long-term detention of PINS
in a facility which suffered from insufficient counselors and staff, inadequate psychiatric assistance, a lack of coordination and communication
among the staff and physical conditions resembling a jail, constituted a
denial of their constitutional right to treatment. In dicta, the court went
so far as to note:
There can be no doubt that the right to treatment, generally, for those held
in non-criminal custody (whether based on due process, equal protection or
the Eighth Amendment, or a combination of them) has by now been recognized by the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts and the courts of New
York."
Consideration of the foregoing statutory and decisional law signifies
that persons adjudicated PINS are entitled to meaningful rehabilitation. 4
If the state is going to deprive children of their liberty by invoking the
parens patriae doctrine, it must meet its responsibility of ensuring that
care and treatment are provided. Unfortunately, the current status of state
training schools indicates that government has been negligent in meeting
its responsibilities.
TREATMENT FOR

PINS

AT STATE TRAINING SCHOOLS

In recognition of the state's affirmative duty to provide appropriate
treatment for PINS, the New York courts in recent years have increasingly
examined the internal management of state training schools housing these
children.8 5 In re Jeanette p.s6 illustrates the movement in this direction.
Noting the unsatisfactory conditions at state training schools, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the placement of Jeanette, an
adjudicated PINS, in such an institution. The court held that petitioner's
record contained positive evidence that such a disposition would result in
harmful effects upon her."7 Similarly, in In re lone .,8 the family court
set aside the placement of an adjudicated PINS in a training school which
had failed to provide the child with court-ordered psychiatric care.
In In re Mario," however, the family court held that the placement of
Id. at 599. The only Supreme Court decision cited in this regard was Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962), which held that drug addiction could not be a crime in the absence of
treatment. 349 F. Supp. at 599. For a detailed account of the constitutional argument for the
right to treatment in the juvenile justice system, see Brief for Appellant at 18-20, In re Ellery
C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973); Brief for Appellant at 4-30, Nelson
v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972); Brief for Nat'l Juvenile Law Center as Amicus
Curiae at 6-25, Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
" See note 53 supra.
See In re Mario, 65 Misc. 2d 708,713, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659, 664 (Family Ct. New York County
1971); Beyond-Control Child, supra note 54, at 184.
" 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1970).
Id. at 661-62, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
64 Misc. 2d 878, 316 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Family Ct. Queens County 1970).
65 Misc. 2d 708, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Family Ct. New York County 1971).
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a 13-year-old PINS in a state training school was "reasonably rehabilitative" and, therefore, constitutional, provided the petitioner was not subjected to any physical force or solitary confinement. The Mario court acknowledged that PINS placements in these institutions previously had
been held invalid, but concluded that each case had to be decided on its
own merits? 0
Prior to Ellery C., therefore, the determination as to the adequacy of
treatment provided for PINS placed in state training schools was based
upon a subjective consideration of the therapy received by the individual.'
The Ellery C. court, however, premised its determination of the inadequacy of treatment in such facilities by considering the institution as a
whole . In so doing, the court refused to limit itself to a mere consideration
of the individual PINS' particular situation.93
In light of the Court of Appeals' recent holding in In re Maurice C.,14
the status of Ellery C. 's standard is unclear. The court now holds that
".. . it is the adequacy of the supervision and treatment . . . provided,
not the characterization of the facility as a Training School, that is determinative""5 of the suitability of PINS' placement. This formulation may
represent a retreat to the pre-Ellery C. subjective approach. Alternatively,
it may be interpreted as the court's use of the Ellery C. standard to find,
as it did, that treatment provided at PINS designated training schools,
viewed as a whole, is adequate.
Id. at 714, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
Accord, In re Arlene H., 38 App. Div. 2d 570, 328 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't 1971); In re
Edward S., 37 App. Div. 2d 977, 328 N.Y.S.2d 235 (2d Dep't 1971).
11 Dr. Birnbaum concludes that once a right to treatment is established, a determination as
to standards of the adequacy of treatment received should be "objectively based upon a
consideration of the institution as a whole and not subjectively premised upon the individual
therapy received." Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 752, 753 (1969); But
see Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134, 1156 (1967). See also
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (court determined the inadequacy of
treatment provided for PINS at a secure detention center).
' There are no established standards used in determining whether proper treatment is provided for PINS in state training schools. Few courts have made any attempt to establish such
standards. But see Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where the court, in
determining whether petitioner, who was involuntarily committed to a mental hospital, was
receiving adequate treatment, observed that: (1) the institution need not demonstrate that
its treatment program will cure or improve, but only that there is "a bona fide effort to do
so"; (2) the effort should be to provide treatment which is adequate in light of present
knowledge; (3) the fact that science has not reached a final determination as to the most
effective therapy cannot "relieve the court of its duty to render an informed decision"; and
(4) continued failure to provide suitable adequate treatment cannot be justified by lack of
staff or facilities. Id. at 456-57. See also Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), where the court pointed out that factors such as (1) personnel qualifications and
training, (2) the ratio of children to professional personnel, and (3) the availability of information about the child must be considered when determining the adequacy of treatment given
PINS in secure detention centers. Id. at 586.
No. 361B (Ct. App., July 15, 1974).
I at 3.
Id.
"
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Current Status of State Training Schools
Just two months prior to Ellery C., Milton Luger, DFY Director, commented that "[t]oo many of our facilities are irrelevant as far as kids'
needs are concerned." 96 The propriety of this statement, as well as of the
conclusion expressed in Ellery C., is sustained by a review of the training
schools' facilities. The comment is further supported by a 1970 study of the
New York training school system, conducted by the State Joint Committee
on Protection of Children and Youth and Drug Abuse, which recommended
that no PINS be placed in these institutions." Consistent with these sentiments, all other major, independent investigations have reported the failure of the training schools to provide adequate rehabilitative treatment. 8
In Ellery C., the Court of Appeals judicially sanctioned the notion that
PINS did not receive proper treatment in the state training schools.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Luger controverted the court's view. He noted that
a number of beneficial changes had been instituted to alleviate the treatment problem since DFY took charge of the training schools in 1971.21
However, in December, 1973, State Comptroller Arthur Levitt released a
report on the rehabilitative programs at the training schools.1 Consistent
with the earlier studies, although milder in tone, the Levitt report scored
the educational and mental health care facilities at these institutions as
below acceptable standards. 01
Oelsner, Juvenile Justice: Helpless Frustration,N.Y. Times, April 3, 1973, at 32, col. 5.
This is the second of a four article series which reports the shortcomings of New York City's
juvenile justice system.
'" JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 32. Accord, CITIZENS' COMMITTEE, supra note
11, at 7.
See reports cited note 11 supra.
N.Y. Times, July 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1. Mr. Luger noted that the use of ombudsmen is an
example of such beneficial changes. Beyond that, the Director indicated that only two of the
schools could be described as closed in the sense of a prison, whereas the remaining eight
institutions were "open." Id.
I'll No. 15 LEVITT REPORT, supra note 11; No. 16 LEVITT REPORT, supra note 11. These reports
cover a 12 month period of study ending in April, 1973.
I Immediately following the release of this report, Mr. Luger, Director of DFY, commented
that although some of Mr. Levitt's critism was justified, much of it was out of date because
of the-prior implementation by DFY of some improvements suggested in the report. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 2, 1973, § 1, at 49, col. 1. See Memorandum from Elizabeth Schack, Director,
Office of Children's Services, to Thomas McCoy, Dec. 11, 1973; Brief for Respondent, app.
B, In re Maurice C., 44 App. Div. 2d 114, 354 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1974). See also No. 15
LEVITT REPORT, supra note 11, wherein the Comptroller's office noted:
Any criticism of the operations of the State training schools must be tempered by the
recognition that they must accept children rejected by voluntary agencies and that
they have never been the recipients of funds equivalent to those provided through
public and private support to the voluntary agencies . . . .[In addition], the training
schools have had to accept an ever-growing number of children coming from the most
troubled home and community situations.
Id. at 48.
'
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The Levitt report's finding as to the inadequacy of staff personnel at
state training schools is indicative of the institutions' failure to provide
appropriate treatment for PINS. For example, child care workers who by
relationship with PINS are usually
the nature of their job have the closest
2
deficient in professional training.1
Clearly, the unique role played by child care workers in the lives of
PINS" 3 warrants that such workers be adequately qualified. However, the
report disclosed both insufficient pre-employment preparation and a failure on the part of the schools to provide needed in-staff training. 4
The professionally trained members of the staff include the psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, all of whom are responsible for the
inmate child's behavorial and emotional therapy. Regarding this aspect of
the training schools' treatment services, the Committee on Mental Health
Services, chaired by the Honorable Justice Polier, reported in 1972:
The fragmented, fractionalized, and inadequate psychiatric, psychological,
and casework services made available by the state for the training schools
cannot possibly provide even a modicum of the treatment services that the
children require. It is doubtful that the part-time psychiatrists

. . .

can even

adequately screen all new admissions and advise on medication, special programs, transfers and discharges.0 5
In making a similar observation concerning the work of psychiatrists and
psychologists, the Levitt report stated: "We question whether as little as
four hours a week of care for 200 children is sufficient to carry out this
phase of the treatment program."' 0
The social workers, unlike the psychiatrists and psychologists, are
required to provide day-to-day, individualized treatment for the children.
To help the inmates "understand their problems and . . . adopt socially

acceptable behavior,"' these employees are required to maintain case
records from which treatment can be planned. According to Levitt's auditors, however, 20.2 percent of 436 required reports were either missing or
had not been prepared and 17.7 percent of those found were prepared
101No. 16 LEvrrr REPORT, supra note 11, Managerial Summary at 4. Presently, there is no
standard civil service requirement for a beginning child care worker; senior, principal, and
head child care workers need have only a high school or equivalency diploma and at least
two years experience in institutional care for delinquent children. Id. at 44. Furthermore, the
child care workers, most of whom are white and residents of nearby rural communities, have
little in common with the black and Puerto Rican children from New York City. POUER
REPORT, supra note 11, at 38.
"'I Child care workers are responsible for the supervision of the children in the living areas.
They must teach the children cleanliness, personal hygiene, etiquette and how to cope with
their peers. In addition, these employees apply individual counseling and guidance when
necessary. No. 16 LEvirr REPORT, supra note 11, at 44.
"' Id. at 44-47.
' POLIER REPORT, supra note 11, at 52.
''
No. 15 LEVIT REPORT, supra note 11, Managerial Summary at 6.
I' at 53.
Id.

20

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

SPRING

1974

late."" Those records examined exhibited broadly stated treatment plans
with little recorded evidence of actual treatment.' °9 Moreover, the report
indicated that little personal consultation existed among the social workers, psychiatrists, and psychologists." '
In addition to the need for proper mental health care, the OCS survey
noted the PINS' desperate need for the best educational services obtainable."' Nevertheless, Mr. Levitt's auditors found "inconsistent patterns"
of educational services, with classroom time for pupils ranging from approximately 3/2 to 10 hours per week. Remedial reading instruction was
unavailable at some schools, and high absenteeism rates were noted among
2
the teachers as well as the students."
In regard to the educational and mental health care at state training
schools, the findings of the Levitt and Polier reports accentuate the irrelevancy of training school facilities to the urgent needs of PINS for adequate
treatment. As Judge Beatrice S. Burstein of the Family Court, Nassau
County, commented: "There is not a single state training institution that
3
can really boast of being a residential treatment center.""
DFY's Proposed Solution
It would be unfair to assert the inadequacy of the current treatment
being provided PINS without acknowledging DFY's efforts to improve the
conditions at state training schools. The most promising feature of the
Division's action subsequent to Ellery C. is embodied in the agency's
Model Staffing Program."' The objective of this plan is "[t]o implement
a decentralized program operation, utilizing the semi-autonomous concept, . . . [by]. . . establish[ing] an effective staffing organization.""' 5
In promulgating its program, DFY sanctioned the maintenance of comprehensive case records to be used by staff in planning appropriate treatment,
psychiatric care for the youths, in-staff training, and constant communication between staff members.
'll Id. at 54. These figures are based on randomly selected case folders of 76 children who were
released from all but one of the state training schools between April and July, 1972. Of these
76 case folders, 436 reports should have been prepared.
"' Id. at 58.
Id. at 53.
See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
"1 No. 15 LEVITT REPORT, supra note 11, Managerial Summary at 3-5, 11-35. Additionally,
the OCS survey indicates that 42% of the children were said to be involved with drug use or
experimentation. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 75. However, only one school
has "what appears to be an effective drug abuse program. None have specialists in this field
on staff." POLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 38. Accord, CITIZENS' COMMITTEE, supra note 11,
at 4.
No. 15 LEVITT REPORT, supra note 11, at 5 (emphasis added).
Brief for Respondent at app. C, In re Maurice C., 44 App. Div. 2d 114, 354 N.Y.S.2d 18
(2d Dep't 1974).
"' Id. at app. C.
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Additionally, and probably of more significance, DFY noted:
[T]he basic treatment unit in each school will be the cottages
[with].

.

.a treatment team . . .established in each of them. The rationale

for this approach is that the problems of each youngster take precedence over
other considerations."'
Each cottage, housing 20 residents, is to be administered by a team responsible for the development and implementation of rehabilitative treatment. The team is to consist of several tiers of professional and nonprofessional workers, each of whom must meet the skill and experience requirements mandated by DFY for his particular function in the treatment plan.
Generally, the job of these team members is oriented toward counseling,
providing a home environment for the youth, and developing interpersonal
relations with the child.
DFY's Model Staffing Program with its accompanying team concept
is apparently devoted to the rehabilitation of the resident youths. How7
ever, the implementation of this program is progressing at a slow rate."
Regrettably, the few DFY model programs which have been instituted in
New York State training schools in the past have been short-lived."' Consequently, the effectiveness of the DFY plan cannot be properly assessed
until it is implemented on a long-term basis.
Until the Model Staffing Program may be fully implemented, DFY
has merely provided for the placement of PINS and juvenile delinquents
119
in separate facilities in purported compliance with Ellery C. As evi'nId.

,,7
As of August, 1974, only one cottage had been instituted in each training school and
recruitment for the program's staff had just begun. Full implementation of the Model Staffing
Program will take approximately one to three years. Interview with Peter Winfield, Director
of Personnel, Division for Youth, Albany, New York, Aug. 8, 1974.
"I Interview with Schlussel, supra note 24. Mr. Schlussel noted that previously DFY proposed
in writing many model programs, based on the cottage unit, which were never implemented.
For example, such a program was proposed for Otisville, a New York State training school.
Yet, no new staff members were hired; in fact, the program was never instituted. In Warwick,
another New York State training school, a proposed mental health cottage was set up in the
summer of 1973 to help those children with more serious menta! health problems. However,
the program lasted only three to four weeks.
"I See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra. See also Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), wherein the court held constitutional the co-mingling of PINS and juvenile
delinquents in secure detention centers. The court noted:
While even defense witnesses agreed that it would be "desirable" to establish separate
facilities for PINS and [juvenile delinquents], the conflict among experts as to
whether joint custody is damaging to PINS is too sharp to sustain a finding of unconstitutionality . . . .Of course, there is considerable debate within the child care profession as to whether PINS should be held in secure detention under any circumstances,
and clearly they may not be so detained unless treatment is provided, but those
questions are separate.
Id.at 595-96.
DFY's segregation plan presents two major questions: (1) will there be an increase in the
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denced by the findings of the Levitt report, the present condition of state
training schools clearly establishes the inadequacy of this approach. Thus,
as noted earlier, Legal Aid properly views the segregation solution as an
assault on the Ellery C. endorsement of the PINS's right to treatment in
12
truly rehabilitative facilities. 1
INTERPRETING THE MANDATE OF

Ellery C.

Conflicting Interpretations
In Ellery C., the New York Court of Appeals had taken a bold step
toward ensuring that effective PINS rehabilitation would be forthcoming.
Chief Judge Fuld noted that PINS must be placed in a suitable environ2
ment, viz., facilities that "provide adequate supervision and treatment."''
The Chief Judge further observed the Legislature's deliberate failure to
mandate confinement of PINS children, concluding that "appellant's confinement . . . with adjudicated juvenile delinquents in a prison
environment" was unjustified. 22 He unequivocally stated that "persons in
23
need of supervision may not validly be placed in a state training school."'1
Such language evinced a recognition by the Court of Appeals of the
PINS's right to treatment and the training schools' failure to provide it.
Ellery C. arguably provided a strong precedent for affirmative remedial
action. Moreover, the court's reasoning was more satisfying than that of
earlier appellate division cases in which it was simply held that family
courts had "abused their discretion" in placing PINS in state training
24
schools.1
number of PINS committed to training schools? and (2) what type of programs will DFY
develop at PINS training schools to distinguish them from those schools designated for
juvenile delinquents?
1211See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
121 32 N.Y.2d at 591, 300 N.E.2d at 425, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
122 Id. at 592, 300 N.E.2d at 425, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 54 (emphasis added). Furthermore, it is
important to note Chief Judge Fuld's reference to N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 255 (McKinney
1963) which empowers the family court to seek the assistance needed to provide that care
which best enhances the child's welfare. The confinement of PINS in state training schools,
the Chief Judge concluded, is inconsistent with the purposes of this section. There appears
to be no explanation for Chief Judge Fuld's reference to the original section 255 which was
amended in 1972. See note 63 supra.
12 32 N.Y.2d at 592, 300 N.E.2d at 425, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
121 See, e.g., In re Arlene H., 38 App. Div. 2d 570, 328 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't 1972); In re
Edward S., 37 App. Div. 2d 977, 328 N.Y.S.2d 235 (2d Dep't 1971); In re Ilone I., 64 Misc. 2d
878, 316 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Family Ct. Queens County 1970). But see In re Jeanette P., 34 App.
Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1970) in which the court quoted the Supreme Court
as saying:
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, an .
'industrial school'
for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a
greater or lesser time. His world becomes 'a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine amd institutional hours . . . . Instead of a mother and father and
sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, cus-
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Nevertheless, DFY, as well as the Corporation Counsel's office, ' contended that Legal Aid's interpretation of Ellery C. as prescribing an absolute prohibition on placement of PINS in state training schools as they are
presently constituted was untenable.'28 DFY's reasoning was based on the
Court of Appeals' failure to declare the legislative authorization for such
placement unconstitutional. This position, however, fails to appreciate the
fact that the amendment to FCA section 756(a),' which authorized the
use of state training schools to house PINS, was intended merely to eliminate the family court's dilemma of being responsible "for placement of
children . . . [yet being] . . . without authority to secure placement,
except in those cases where private agencies would accept them."' 2 Although the amendment authorizes the placement of PINS in state training
schools, it does not negate the original Act's provision for their treatment.
Therefore, since state training schools fail to provide statutorily required
"supervision or treatment," the Act has been violated, and no further
PINS placements in these schools can be tolerated until the schools are
reformed. 129
Judicially Narrowing the Scope of Ellery C.
Faced with the conflicting interpretations of Ellery C., courts deciding
subsequent cases have had available three alternative positions: (1) DFY's
"segregation view"; (2) Legal Aid's "per se prohibition" approach; or (3)
the pre-Ellery C. case-by-case inquiry which determined whether a family
court judge "abused his discretion" in failing to secure the most appropriate facility for treatment and rehabilitation of PINS.'30
todians, state employees, and 'delinquents' confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.
Id., 310 N.Y.S.2d at 126, quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
An abuse of discretion includes the family court's failure to exhaust its investigation into
the availability of proper facilities for the PINS child involved, the failure of Corporation
Counsel to present sufficient proof that state training schools provide treatment, and the
failure of the court to provide a full and fair hearing (e.g., the failure to grant an adjournment
as requested by the law guardian). See interview with Schlussel, supra note 24.
,"I
Corporation Counsel represents New York City in family court proceedings dealing with
PINS.
"I,
See Brief for Respondent at 9-10, In re Maurice C., 44 App. Div. 2d 114, 354 N.Y.S.2d 18
(2d Dep't 1974).
"I N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 756(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
z'In re Anonymous, 40 Misc. 2d 1058, 1060, 245 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Family Ct. Bronx County
1963).
2 The amendment on its face is constitutional. However, the means by which it has been
put into practice offend the FCA's mandate for proper treatment.
I'l
See note 124 supra. The Ellery C. decision has been considered in subsequent cases. See
In re Evelyn M., 43 App. Div. 2d 563, 349 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.), wherein the
court held that PINS, currently confined in state training schools pursuant to orders made
prior to Ellery C., are "entitled to remission of their cases to the Family Court for placement
in suitable treatment programs." Id., 349 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
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The interpretation question was squarely presented to' 3' and resolved
by the Court of Appeals in the recent decision in In re Maurice C. 3 There,
the appellant was alleged to be "suffering from childhood schizophrenia,
poor judgment and lack of insight .... 33 He had a long history of placement in and elopement from foster homes and other facilities. However,
the boy had never committed acts which would characterize him as a
juvenile delinquent. ' 3 The Family Court, Kings County, subsequent to
Ellery C., ordered the appellant placed in a state training school.'35
On appeal, Maurice C.'s law guardian'36 argued that Ellery C. prohibited the placement of PINS in state training schools, thereby rendering the
family court's disposition illegal.' 31 Corporation Counsel and DFY, on the
other hand, contended that the "segregation" policy complied with Ellery
C. I1.38

The Appellate Division, Second Department, refused to rely on DFY's
"mere protestations of conformity"' 39 with Ellery C. Instead, the court
examined OCS's report and concluded:
[T]oo little has been done, . . .the quality of care and treatment in the
training schools must be improved, . . . [and] . . . adequate fiscal re-

sources must be provided to acquire competent staff and facilities. It is
conceded that such staff and facilities have not yet been provided and, moreThe appellant in In re Maurice C., 44 App. Div. 2d 114, 354 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1974)
argued that although the opinion in In re Evelyn M. did not discuss DFY's segregation tactic,
the segregation argument was raised and "obviously rejected" by the court. Brief for Appellant at 10. The respondent, however, disagreed with this interpretation of the case. Brief for
Respondent at 10-11.
Furthermore, the appellant in Maurice C. argued that Legal Aid's interpretation of
Ellery C. was confirmed in Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350
N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973) (civilly committed mental patient, though dangerously mentally ill,
cannot be transferred to prison hospital). Brief for Appellant at 8-9. In that case, the Court
of Appeals cited Ellery C. not only for the co-mingling problem but for the proposition that
non-criminals who are deprived of their liberty must be provided with suitable and adequate
treatment, the absence of which cannot be justified by the lack of funds or staff.
1:11
See Brief for Appellant at 6-13; Brief for Respondent at 9-14, In re Maurice C., 44 App.
Div. 2d 114, 354 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1974) wherein the issue was set forth before the
Appellate Division, Second Department.
"I No. 361B (Ct. App., July 15, 1974), rev'g 44 App. Div. 2d 114, 354 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't
1974).
In re Maurice C., 44 App. Div. 2d 114, 116, 354 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20 (2d Dep't 1974).
Id. at 115, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 19. See Brief for Respondent at 2-7 for the history of Maurice
C. in the Family Court.
44 App. Div. 2d at 115, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
'' The law guardian is the attorney who represents PINS in Family Court.
"31 See Brief for Appellant at 6-8, In re Maurice C., 44 App. Div. 2d 114, 354 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d
Dep't 1974).
"3 DFY filed a brief as amicus curiae.
'31
44 App. Div. 2d at 116, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 20. See Brief for Respondent at 10-12, In re
Maurice C., 44 App. Div. 2d 114, 354 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1974).
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over, that in the instant case the training school had but one half-time
psychiatrist for one hundred children. 4 ,
The court did not merely denounce the conditions at the New York
State training schools, but further noted the distinction drawn in Ellery
C. between the confinement of a juvenile delinquent in the quasi-criminal
institutional setting of a training school and the treatment and supervision
necessary to rehabilitate a PINS child. The court unanimously held:
The record. . . does not demonstrate that the institution in which this infant
has been confined meets the standards set in Ellery C. . . . , for the care and
treatment of PINS children . . . . [W]e cannot permit this unfortunate
child to be confined in the training school at this time. He needs care and
psychiatric treatment in a more therapeutic setting than has thus far been
achieved in the training school program.'
Accordingly, the court reversed the order appealed from and remitted the
proceeding to the family court for the placement of the appellant in a
"suitable environment." In applying the Ellery C. recognition of a right to
treatment, the court rejected DFY's segregation solution, implicitly accepting the Legal Aid viewpoint. This judicial pronouncement increased
the probability that urgently needed care and treatment facilities for PINS
would soon be operative.'
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the Second Department's
decision."' In so doing, it held that absent "a clear showing" that the
treatment afforded PINS children at state training schools is "significantly
inadequate," DFY's current segregation policy is statutorily and constitutionally premissible.'"
In adopting DFY's interpretation of Ellery C., the Maurice C. court
relied heavily upon the agency's presentation of the Model Staffing Program. Recognizing DFY's efforts to upgrade the training schools, its current employment therein of one part-time psychiatrist and one psychologist, and its future plans pursuant to the Model Staffing Program, the
court held:
"1 44 App. Div. 2d at 116, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 20. In addressing itself to DFY's claimed conformity to the EUery C. standard, the Second Department also noted that the Model Staffing
Program has yet to be implemented. Id. at 115, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
Id. at 116, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
12 Clearly, if the state training school system were completely revamped to provide proper
rehabilitative treatment facilities and personnel, the placement of PINS in these institutions
would be legal.
No. 361B (Ct. App., July 15, 1974).
The court's recognition of a constitutional right to treatment is implicit in its opinion
which provides:
Whatever the altruistic theory for depriving the child of his liberty, if proper and
necessary treatment is not forthcoming, a serious question of due process is raised.
Id. at 5, citing Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also text accompanying
notes 73-83 supra.
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On the total record before us, we cannot assume that the necessary initiatives
to establish a fully adequate program of supervision and treatment for PINS
children at the Training Schools, already begun, will not be carried to fruition . . . . A different question will be presented if at a later time it appears

that it has not. But for the present, we note that the Division for Youth has
made a commendable start toward .
to necessary care and treatment. 4 '

. .

implementing the PINS child's right

CONCLUSION

In Ellery C. the Court of Appeals meritoriously determined that the
rights of PINS were violated in the training school system. Regrettably,
however, the court in Maurice C. rejected Legal Aid's interpretation of
Ellery C. and sanctioned PINS' placement in these schools on a modified
basis. Clearly, PINS should not be committed to these institutions until
proper facilities and well-trained personnel are provided to effectuate rehabilitative care to which these children are entitled.
The current lack of proper treatment in the training schools is substantiated by reference to the OCS and Levitt reports. The OCS profile of
PINS indicated that these children have behavioral problems of a noncriminal nature. Accordingly, proper care must be provided, and "quasicriminal" institutions, as are currently in operation, are unfit for the task.
The Levitt report, in describing the facilities at these institutions, confirmed that placements therein deprived PINS of their statutory and constitutional right to treatment. Unfortunately, DFY's Model Staffing Program has not, as yet, served to alleviate these deplorable conditions.14
Ellery C. offered a clear judicial statement of the need for reform in
the field of juvenile care as administered under state supervision. Its immediate effect would have been an improvement of the present training
school system. Moreover, the Court of Appeals' decision, reinforced by the
Appellate Division in Maurice C., narrowed the gap between the humanitarian philosophy underlying the creation of the PINS classification and
the approach of the family court to date. These decisions would have
compelled the family court, Legislature, and institutional administrators
to "seek and adopt [more] effective, rational, and constantly improving
treatment programs" for PINS.14
I No. 361B (Ct. App., July 15, 1974) at 4. In Maurice C. the Court of Appeals attempts to
define the right to treatment. According to the court, the concept embraces a "bona fide effort
to adequately treat ... [PINSI in light of present knowledge" and "a requirement of initial
diagnosis and of periodic assesment of the PINS child's needs in order that individualized
treatment may be revised as the diagnosis develops." Id. at 5.
"' See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
", Dr. Nicholas Kittrie, a leading advocate of the right to treatment doctrine, noted:
The time is short. Unless necessary precautions are taken to guarantee that the recognition of the right to treatment, the establishment of its criteria, and the machinery
for its enforcement are carefully formulated, public dissension and interagency bicker-
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The Court of Appeals in Maurice C., however, insists that it is not in
its "province to determine what is the best possible treatment or to espouse
an ideal but perhaps unattainable standard."'' 8 The court somehow clings
to the hope that by placing its confidence in DFY and threatening future
sanction if DFY should fail, the PINS children's dilemma in state training
schools will be resolved. In light of DFY's past record,' 49 it would seem more
appropriate to expect that the Model Staffing Program will not satisfactorily provide PINS with rehabilitative treatment in the New York State
training institutions.
Maurice C. represents a significant step in derogation of the inroads
made by Ellery C. in the field of juvenile care. 5 ' The retrenchment evidenced therein signifies that the only current hope for adequate rehabilitative treatment for PINS rests with DFY's Model Staffing Program. Should
it prove unsuccessful, the costly and time-consuming process of seeking
judicial or legislative change must once more be undertaken.
ing may ensue, and one more opportunity for the law's constructive contribution to
social engineering will fail to materialize.
Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 GEo. L.J.
848, 885 (1969). Cf. YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AND DELINQUENCY, PREVENTION ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE; Bazelon,

Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court 4 (Pub. No. SRS 72 1970).
Two states have recently taken major steps in seeking alternatives to placing children in
institutions and have emphasized the use of community resources. California, for example,
subsidizes those counties which reduce their commitments to state institutions. These subsidies, however, must be used in community-based probation supervision programs. In Massachusetts, all the state schools were closed by the summer of 1972 and children were placed in
community rehabilitation programs. No. 15 LEVITT REPORT, supra note 11, at 6-7.
It is interesting to note that within a short period after Ellery C. was decided, the
development of two trends was discovered in the family court procedure: (1) judges became
unwilling to continue reducing delinquency charges to PINS charges since they believed the
training schools could not be utilized even if no other facilities were found for the children,
and (2) some probation officers became hesitant to recommend that petitioners file a PINS
rather than a delinquency petition. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17-18.
No. 361B (Ct. App., July 15, 1974) at 5.
l' See note 118 supra.
It is noteworthy that one week after Maurice C. was decided, the Appellate Division,
Second Department, reversed the placement of a 15 year-old adjudicated PINS child in a
state training school based on the lack of testimony at the family court hearing as to whether
the training school satisfied the Ellery C. requirements. See In re Shirley G., No. 973E (2d
Dep't, July 22, 1974). It is unclear, however, whether the Second Department was aware of
the Court of Appeals' ruling in Maurice C. when it so decided.

